Herding Bullfrogs Towards a More Balanced Wheelbarrow:1
An Illustrative Recommendation for Federal Sentencing Post-Booker
Brian R. Gallini & Emily Q. Shults
In

hindsight,

the

groundwork

preceding

the

so-called

“landmark” decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), invalidating portions of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) was laid long before its issuance.
Consider, for example, the surprising resignation of former United
States District Judge John S. Martin, who told The Associated Press
that “Congress is mandating things simply because they want to show
how tough they are on crime with no sense of whether this makes
sense

or

is

meaningful.”2

Shortly

thereafter

came

Justice

Kennedy’s address to the American Bar Association, during which he
observed “the compromise that led to the guidelines led also to an
increase in the length of prison terms. We should revisit this
compromise.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be revised

downward.”3
Other examples abound.

In 2004, the non-profit group Families

Against Mandatory Minimums completed a lengthy study of Arizona’s
mandatory minimum sentencing laws and concluded that such laws fuel
the prison overcrowding crisis, fill prisons with non-violent
substance abusers, and cost millions of dollars while doing little
to enhance public safety.4

That same year, the American College of

Trial Lawyers compiled an exhaustive critique of the Sentencing
1

Guidelines

concluding

that

“fundamentally flawed.”5

the

Sentencing

Guidelines

are

In similar fashion, the CATO Institute

published a critique of federal sentencing in 2002, which likewise
concludes that “[i]t is time to scrap the commission and its
Guidelines, and to embark on a new age of moral judgment in
sentencing.”6
The

foregoing

authorities
mention.7
Supreme

examples

criticizing

the

are

merely

Guidelines

illustrative;

are

far

too

many

the
to

Given this, it was hardly a surprise then that the
Court

Guidelines

took

a

significant

unconstitutional

when

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

step
it

is

toward

declaring

issued

Blakely

the
v.

In striking down Washington

state’s sentencing guidelines, the Court held that “the relevant
‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose
after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose
without any additional findings.”8

As a result, the central

question immediately became what impact, if any, the Blakely
decision would have on the constitutionality of the Guidelines.9
Predictably, the judiciary responded with conflicting results;
during the interim period after Blakely, but before Booker, the
Sixth

Circuit

determined

that

“Blakely

does

not

compel

the

conclusion that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth
Amendment.”10

Conversely, however, the Ninth Circuit found “there

is no principled distinction between the Washington Sentencing
2

Reform Act at issue in Blakely and the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.”11
The Circuit split was settled on January 12, 2005, when the
Supreme Court concluded that the holding in Blakely applies to the
Guidelines.12
articulated

The so-called “remedial” majority opinion further
that

the

Guidelines

mandatory sentencing rules.13

could

no

longer

operate

as

Instead, according to the Court, the

Guidelines would, going forward, require a sentencing court to
consider Guideline ranges, but permit the court “to tailor the
sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.”14

Under

this new regime, a district court’s sentencing determination would
be viewed from the standpoint of reasonableness.15
Courts initially believed that “Booker is not an invitation to
do business as unusual”16 and, in fact, went so far as to hold that
any

defendant

constituted

sentenced

plain

Amendment rights.17

error

pursuant
in

to

violation

mandatory

of

a

Guidelines

defendant’s

Sixth

The past year’s post-Booker jurisprudence has,

however, reflected the judiciary’s unshakeable addiction to the
Guidelines.18

Indeed,

in

contravention

of

Booker’s

expressed

intention to have district court’s rely almost exclusively on jury
factfinding,19

appellate

courts

now

consistently

divest

the

discretion otherwise afforded to sentencing courts by resolving the
applicability of sentencing enhancements,20 and examining so-called
“acquitted

conduct”

to

impose
3

a

penalty.21

Perhaps

more

problematically, appellate courts have seemingly wholly ignored the
inter-relation between the Court’s holding in Booker and its
earlier decision in United States v. Cotton, which held that
Apprendi “facts must also be charged in the indictment.”22
In short, although the post-Booker legal landscape continues
to evolve on a daily basis, the judiciary’s direction points toward
some measure of consistency.

Part I of this Article will provide

an overview of the history and prevailing motivations behind the
promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

Using the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as an illustrative example,23
Part II will contend that, notwithstanding the supposed “farreaching” implications of both Blakely and Booker, the judiciary’s
continued reliance on the “advisory” Guidelines has practically
changed federal sentencing procedures very little in form or
function.

In contrast, Part III examines the State of Maine’s

sentencing

scheme

and

its

Booker/Blakely decisions.
procedure

reflects

a

response

to

the

Supreme

Court’s

By arguing that Maine’s sentencing

commonsense

approach

to

sentencing

by

affording substantial discretion to sentencing courts within the
confines of a determinate sentencing system, the Article concludes
by advocating a revision to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
reflect a mixed determinate/indeterminate sentencing system.

The

Guidelines, however carefully crafted, have long been in need of
substantial adjustment.

This Article proffers that, rather than
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insisting upon their immutability, federal sentencing would do well
to reflect upon its own history, and the evolution of its state
counterparts.

After all, “little inconveniences in the forms of

justice . . . are the price that all free nations must pay for
their liberty in more substantial matters . . . .”24
I.
The

present

muddled

state

of

the

Federal

Sentencing

Guidelines, culminating in the milestone decisions of Booker and
Blakely, has a long and subtle history.

This section does not

purport to serve as a comprehensive guide, but instead attempts to
provide an overview of the competing philosophies and concerns that
have

influenced

the

evolution

of

federal

procedure.25

The

recitation of the broad history of federal sentencing, contrasted
with

the

relatively

short

history

of

the

Federal

Sentencing

Guidelines, bolsters the case for viewing the federal sentencing
structure as an improving continuum, not an immutable scheme.

As

such, improvements are still to come, and, as this Article later
suggests, federal sentencing would be wise to look to its state
counterparts for alternatives and potential improvements to the
Guidelines.
1.

An Overview of Early Sentencing.

In the early stages of federal sentencing, judges possessed
wide discretion in the imposing of sentences.26

For nearly two-

hundred years, minimal appellate review of sentencing judge’s
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determinations existed.27

This broad entrustment of sentencing

discretion was a product of the termed “rehabilitative ideal”
philosophy of sentencing.28

The approach was based on the “concepts

of the offender’s possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a view
that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate and
thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal activity
upon his return to society.”29

Thus, sentencing judges and parole

officers “were in positions to exercise, and usually did exercise,
very broad discretion.”30
The rehabilitative motivations fueling the broad discretion
afforded to sentencing judges was particularly evident in the
Supreme Court’s Williams v. New York decision.31

There, the Court

reviewed a trial court’s sentence of death, despite a jury’s
recommendation of life imprisonment, based upon information about
defendant that was not presented at trial but, instead, contained
within a pre-sentence report.32
right

to

confront

and

Defendant contended that he had a

cross-examine

information

derived

from

prosecution witnesses considered in the sentencing evaluation; the
Court disagreed.33

Affirming both the conviction and sentence, the

Supreme Court distinguished the procedural regulations required for
determining

guilt

from

the

procedural

regulations

governing

sentencing, noting the latter was “[h]ighly relevant –- if not
essential

-–

to

[the

sentencing

judge’s]

selection

of

an

appropriate sentence [because sentencing judges could possess] the
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fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and
characteristics.”34

Thus,

“modern

concepts

individualizing

punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing
judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information
by

a

requirement

of

rigid

adherence

to

restrictive

evidence properly applicable to the trial.”35

rules

of

This concept of

“individualiz[ed] punishment” worked in tandem with the “the belief
that by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted
offenders many could be less severely punished and restored sooner
to complete freedom and useful citizenship”36 -- a sentiment nothing
short of the rehabilitative ideal.37
2.

Reform.

Beginning in the 1950s, and continuing throughout the 1960s
and 70s, criminal justice researchers and scholars began to voice
concerns about the indeterminate sentencing structure.38
pointed to three fundamental concerns:

Critics

(1) the lack of success in

accomplishing rehabilitative goals; (2) anxiety among prisoners
resulting from uncertainty and disparity in sentencing; and (3) the
conceptual discrepancy between the ideals of equality and the rule
of law, exemplified by “unwarranted disparities” -– such as racial
bias–in sentence length.39

Perhaps the most vocal critic of the

indeterminate sentence structure was judge Marvin Frankel, who
published
sentencing

a

plethora
as

judges

of

scholarship

“[s]ubject
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lambasting

essentially

indeterminate
to

no

law.”40

Simultaneously,

concerns

about

rising

crime

rates

inspired

advocates of tougher criminal penalties to support calls for
sentencing reform.41
Following revisions in several states,42 the federal government
initiated changes in sentencing procedures with the passage of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the “Act”), thereby creating the
U.S.

Sentencing

Guidelines.43

Commission,

which

in

turn,

promulgated

the

Unlike the rehabilitative motivations that buoyed

indeterminate sentencing, the Guidelines did not align itself with
any one penal ideology.44

On the contrary, the preceding bills and

the final Guidelines listed four generally accepted justifications
for

criminal

sentencing

considered[.]”45

for

the

sentencing

court

“to

be

These justifications -– retribution, deterrence,

incapacitation, and rehabilitation -– were proffered without any
further

guidance

afforded.46

as

to

the

amount

of

weight

each

should

be

In retrospect, perhaps the most glaring omission from

both of the new substantive state and federal sentencing laws was
the lack of procedural sentencing laws with which to provide form
to the newly announced substance.47

The Act did not set forth, or

even mention, a requisite sentencing procedure, save for a few
passing comments,48 largely rendered moot by existing statutory
law.49
In the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court dealt with a direct
constitutional challenge to the revised sentencing guidelines in
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McMillan v. Pennsylvania.50

The criminal defendants in McMillan

challenged Pennsylvania’s sentencing guidelines, enacted in 1982,
which imposed a five-year mandatory minimum sentence if a judge
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the criminal
defendant “visibly possessed a firearm” during the commission of
enumerated offenses.51

In upholding the guideline against the

challenge, the McMillan Court concluded that “States may treat
‘visible possession of a firearm’ as a sentencing consideration
rather than an element of a particular offense,” without any
heightened burden of proof.52

The Court further relied upon

Williams, which constitutionally blessed judicial discretion, for
the proposition that, “[s]entencing courts have traditionally heard
evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at
all.”53

Yet

despite

this

seemingly

binding

precedent,

the

conceptual motivations underpinning Williams were not present in
McMillan.

Professor Douglas A. Berman aptly notes that, contrary

to the rehabilitative threads which infused the Williams decision
and purportedly justified broad judicial discretion, the mandatory
minimum sentence in Pennsylvania was promulgated with the specified
goals of “protect[ing] the public from armed criminals and [ ]
deter[ring] violent crime . . . as well as to . . . punish[ ] those
who commit serious crimes with guns.”54
The constitutional approval of determinate sentencing crested
with the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision, United States v. Watts.55
9

There, again relying on Williams, the Court upheld a federal
guideline

requiring

an

increase

in

the

criminal

defendant’s

sentence if the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant had committed certain underlying charges, even
if the defendant was acquitted.56

In his dissent, Justice Stevens

criticized the majority’s reliance on Williams, noting that “its
rationale depended largely on agreement with an individualized
sentencing

regime

that

Guidelines system.”57
“[t]he

goals

of

is

significantly

different

from

the

Moreover, according to Justice Stevens,
rehabilitation

and

fairness

served

by

individualized sentencing that formerly justified vesting judges
with

virtually

replaced

by

unreviewable
the

sentencing

impersonal

discretion

interest

in

have

been

uniformity

and

retribution.”58
3.

The Fall.

Post-Watts, determinate sentencing was not without its share
of academic critics, yet it nevertheless appeared to have achieved
a

measure

of

legal

permanence

constitutional sanctions.59

stemming

from

the

foregoing

The Supreme Court had repeatedly relied

upon judicial discretion as a justification for tolerating the
loose

procedural

form

of

sentencing

Guidelines,

but

had

not

conceptualized the effect the substantive change of the Guidelines
had on that discretion.

Then, twelve years after Watts, the

Supreme Court undertook Almendarez-Torres v. United States60 and
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Jones v. United States,61 cases in which several of the justices
expressed doubts about the constitutional viability of judgedetermined

sentencing

procedures.

Both

cases

involved

the

Guidelines’ potential for sentence enhancements resulting from
judge-found

facts

-–

prior

injury” -– respectively.62

convictions

and

“resulting

bodily

In holding that the contested guideline

was constitutional in Almendarez-Torres and unconstitutional in
Jones, the Court focused its analysis on the text of the applicable
statutes; namely, whether the judge-found fact constituted an
element of the crime or a sentencing factor.63

Ultimately, the

Court avoided confronting the issue in Jones by emphasizing that it
was not adopting a constitutional rule, but merely interpreting “a
particular federal statute in light of a set of constitutional
concerns.”64
Both the Almendarez-Torres and Jones Courts foreshadowed a
shift in the constitutional treatment of determinate sentencing
procedures.
reconcile

One year later, a sharply divided Court struggled to
its

divergent

ideologies

when

a

state

defendant

challenged a New Jersey statute providing that his sentence could
be enhanced if the sentencing court determined by a preponderance
that “[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose
to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of
race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or
ethnicity.”65

Deeming the statute unconstitutional, the Court
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announced that:

“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.”66

Although today, with the foreknowledge of the

Booker/Blakely decisions, the impact of the rule announced in
Apprendi seems broad, the ruling’s impact was largely contained;
lower federal and state courts interpreted the new rule narrowly,
and legislatures failed to take remedial action to alter sentencing
Guidelines and recommendations.67

Determinate sentencing became the

programmatic, and somewhat enormous, law of the land; perhaps
fundamental changes seemed too overwhelming an undertaking.
The

biggest

shocks

were

still

to

come.

In

Blakely

v.

Washington, the Court struck down a provision of the Washington
State sentencing guidelines enhancing a defendant’s sentence based
on the judge-found fact that the defendant’s criminal kidnapping
involved “deliberate cruelty.”68

In a decision which echoed the

concerns of Justice Stevens in Watts, Blakely stated that:

“when a

judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict does not allow,
the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential
to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his authority.”69

Although

the Court stated that it expressed no opinion on the federal
sentencing guidelines,70 the Blakely Court cast grave doubt on the
vim of determinate sentencing legislation nationwide.

Following

the Blakely decision, federal district and circuit courts viewed
12

the continuing vitality of the Guidelines with some skepticism and,
according to a report of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, “no longer
uniformly applied the sentencing guidelines.”71
The other shoe dropped soon thereafter.

Although the Court’s

audience anticipated the expansion of Blakely with the grant of
expedited review in United States v. Booker72 and United States v.
Fanfan,73 they were unprepared for the Court’s choice of remedy.
Arguably, the holding in Blakely foreshadowed a larger role for
juries in sentencing procedures by ensuring that all facts capable
of enhancing a defendant’s final sentence were, in fact, proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.74

The Booker Court even observed that

Sixth Amendment jurisprudence “forced the Court to address the
question of how the right to jury trial could be preserved, in a
meaningful way, guaranteeing that the jury would still stand
between the individual and the power of the government in the new
sentencing regime.”75

Yet instead of increasing the role of the

jury in determinate sentencing, the piecemeal five-justice Booker
majority remedied the constitutional infractions present in the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines by invalidating the mandatory nature
of the scheme, thereby making it wholly advisory.76
4.

Current Sentencing Procedure.

The current state of determinate sentencing pursuant to the
Guidelines is an evolving enigma.

Although Part II will proffer

that, in reality, the tide of Booker’s potential impact has largely
13

been

stemmed,

perhaps

even

completely

dammed,

by

the

narrow

judicial application of Booker’s holding, post-Booker jurisprudence
has molded a “new” sentencing procedure that has reached some
measure of rote consistency.

Booker instructs that “[t]he district

courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those
guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”77

Thus, the

calculation of the would-be mandatory guideline range is still the
first step in any sentencing assessment.78

Tellingly, the Fourth

Circuit noted that in most post-Booker cases, “a district court
will calculate, consult, and take into account the exact same
guideline range that it would have applied under the pre Booker
mandatory

guidelines

regime.”79

Indeed,

the

“guideline

remains the starting point for the sentencing decision.

range

And, if

the district court decides to impose a sentence outside that range,
it should explain its reasons for doing so.”80
The calculation of this “advisory” range remains rife with
judicial

fact-finding.

unconstitutional,

While

Booker’s

holding

remedy

the

Guidelines

nonetheless

scheme

purported

to

“maintain[] a strong connection between the sentence imposed and
the offender’s real conduct -– a connection important to the
increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress intended its
Guidelines system to achieve.”81

The U.S. Sentencing Commission and

subsequent

has

circuit

case

law

interpreted

this

guidance

validation of judicial fact-finding with regard to a defendant’s
14

relevant conduct.82

Indeed, although defendants have protested,

arguing that Booker required any disputed fact to be submitted to a
jury, the circuits have now nearly unanimously held that Booker
only proscribes judicial fact-finding that increases a defendant’s
sentence above the statutory maximum.83
Circuit succinctly stated:
factfinding.

In a recent case, the Sixth

“Booker did not eliminate judicial

Instead, the remedial majority gave district courts

the option, after calculating the Guideline range, to sentence a
defendant outside the resulting Guideline range.”84
II.
Bearing the foregoing characterization in mind, Part II will
examine the changed aspects of sentencing as exemplified by the
Sixth Circuit.

Although the court candidly acknowledged that

“[a]chieving agreement between the circuit courts and within each
circuit on post-Booker issues has, unfortunately, been like trying
to herd bullfrogs into a wheelbarrow,”85 the Sixth Circuit has
proved to be at the forefront of Booker jurisprudence,86 and its
disposition of Booker issues provides insight into the larger
direction of the judiciary.

Through the specific examples of

judicial fact-finding in the calculation of the Guidelines, the
uniform approval of “shadow” sentences, the “rebuttable presumption
of reasonableness” for within Guidelines sentences, and Booker’s
general effect on sentencing factors, Part II will demonstrate how
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the realities of post-Booker application have dwarfed the potential
impact of Booker and the promise of increased judicial discretion.
1.

Judicial fact-finding in Guidelines’ calculations.

Shortly after the issuance of Booker, the Sixth Circuit issued
a flurry of cases attempting to distill its application to judicial
fact-finding at sentencing.

In one of its earliest cases, United

States v. Oliver,87 the circuit held that the district court
erroneously imposed a sentence exceeding the maximum Guidelines’
range “based upon judge-found fact” and the pre-Booker sentencing
Guidelines.88

Although the defendant in Oliver was sentenced

pursuant to the mandatory Guidelines, the spirit of Oliver did not
seem constricted to stake its holding on this narrower point,
stating: “A sentencing error that leads to a violation of the Sixth
Amendment by imposing a more severe sentence than is supported by
the

jury

verdict

‘would

diminish

the

integrity

and

public

reputation of the judicial system [and] also would diminish the
fairness of the criminal sentencing system.’”89
Although

the

spirit

of

Oliver

seemingly

intimated

the

circuit’s complete disapproval of judge-found facts in post-Booker
sentencing,

subsequent

significantly.

cases

narrowed

Oliver’s

sentiments

The Sixth Circuit quickly adopted an expansive

notion of what comprised “facts admitted by the defendant.”

At the

outset, the court held that facts stipulated in plea agreements
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comprised admissions by defendants.90

The court then concluded that

facts included in the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), and not objected
to by the defendant, constituted admitted facts for sentencing
purposes.91
The propriety of independent judicial factfinding, however,
remained in doubt.

Initially, in United States v. Davis, the Sixth

Circuit condemned post-Booker judge-found facts by holding that
“the district court did exactly what the Supreme Court found to be
a violation of the Sixth Amendment in Booker: the district court
engaged in independent fact-finding which enhanced Defendant’s
sentence beyond the facts established by the jury verdict or
admitted by Defendant.”92

The tide quickly turned after the

issuance of United States v. Davidson,93

wherein the Sixth Circuit

more directly addressed whether sentencing courts may independently
find facts to enhance a defendant’s sentence pursuant to the
Guidelines.
In Davidson, two defendants appealed their convictions on the
basis of guilty pleas to the attempted manufacture of narcotics and
possession

of

stolen

vehicle.94

The

defendants

specifically

challenged the district court’s imposition of a firearm enhancement
to

lengthen

their

sentence

based

on

facts

that

admitted by the defendants, nor found by the jury.95

were

neither

At the outset

of its analysis, the Davidson court acknowledged that “absent the
judicial

findings

that

Mrs.

Davidson
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possessed

a

firearm

in

connection with the attempt to manufacture methamphetamine . . .
Mrs. Davidson’s sentencing range would have been substantially
lower.”96

Although the Court correspondingly recognized Booker’s

express prohibition against the imposition of sentences based on
such unconstitutional judicial fact-finding, it nonetheless went on
to review the propriety of the facts found by the district court to
support its utilization of the firearm enhancement.97

In doing so,

the court quizzically stated that, “for purposes of determining the
Guidelines recommendation, we continue to accept a district court’s
factual finding that a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug
crime unless it is clearly erroneous.”98
for

purposes

of

determining

a

Thus, the court concluded,
“non-mandatory

Guidelines

recommendation,” it would not be error for the district court to
impose a guideline-specified “Firearm Enhancement” to defendants’
sentences on remand.99
In keeping with the rationale of Davidson, the Sixth Circuit
now routinely approves of judicial fact-finding in sentencing;
indeed, district courts “must . . . calculate the Guideline range
as they would have done prior to Booker.”100
still

consider

reliable

Guidelines sentence.101
uncharged

or

acquitted

hearsay

in

Sentencing courts may

calculating

the

advisory

Likewise, sentencing courts may consider
conduct

in

fashioning

the

defendant’s

appropriate Guidelines range, so long as the resulting sentence
does not exceed the statutory maximum sentence.102
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Thus, to the

extent that Booker impacted independent judicial factfinding at
sentencing, it did so only inasmuch as to require the sentencing
court to acknowledge that the Guidelines are now advisory, not
mandatory.
2.
In

Shadow Sentences.
discerning

what

factors

sufficiently

reflected

the

sentencing court’s awareness of the “advisory” status of the
Guidelines,

the

Sixth

Circuit

quickly

approved

the

constitutionality of so-called “shadow” sentences -– a preventative
tactic employed by district courts in the months following Blakely
and leading up to Booker.

As a general rule, the Sixth Circuit

vacated sentences imposed pursuant to a sentencing court’s belief
that the Guidelines provided a mandatory sentencing scheme.103
handful

of

crafty

courts,

however,

and

issued

forward-thinking
two

sentences:

pre-Booker
one

A

sentencing

sentence

if

the

Guidelines were upheld as constitutional and another “shadow”
sentence

in

case

the

Supreme

Court

found

the

Guidelines

unconstitutional.
In United States v. Christopher, the Sixth Circuit considered
the propriety of issuing these alternative “shadow” sentences.104
In Christopher, the district court first adopted the pre-sentence
report’s offense level and loss calculations, and then issued two
identical sentences -– one treating the Guidelines as a mandatory
sentencing scheme and the other applying § 3553(a) as the governing
19

statute.”105

Affirming the practice, the Sixth Circuit concluded

“that

a

when

district

court

imposes

alternative,

identical

sentences, one under a regime in which Guidelines enhancements are
not

mandatory,

the

harmlessness

of

any

Booker

error

is

established.”106
This blanket acceptance of a district court’s alternative
sentencing declaration epitomizes the Sixth Circuit’s desire for a
“quick-fix” to the problems created by Booker.
discussed
court’s

below,

specific

determination

of

standards
whether

a

facilitate
defendant’s

Although, as
the

reviewing

sentence

is

“reasonable,” condoning the use of “shadow” sentences improperly
invites that court to accept sentences devoid of any analysis from
the sentencing court.107
3.

Reasonableness Review.

The Sixth Circuit has acceded in a recent opinion that postBooker, “we, along with the rest of the federal appellate system,
have struggled to define the meaning of reasonableness review for
sentencing purposes.”108

Pursuant to Booker’s instruction, the

court concluded that, “when a defendant challenges a district
court’s sentencing determination, [it is] instructed to determine
‘whether [the] sentence is unreasonable.’”109

Accordingly, the

circuit has separated reasonableness challenges into two arguments:
(1) procedural unreasonableness; i.e., the failure of a court to
adequately consider the sentencing factors enumerated by § 3553(a),
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and (2) the unreasonableness of the sentence imposed; i.e., the
district court placed undue weight on one particular factor, which
resulted in an unreasonable sentence.110
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553 governs both forms of reasonableness
review.111

Pursuant to § 3553(a), a sentencing court must consider:

(1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant;” (2) the
need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense; to protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the appropriate advisory guideline range; (5) any
other pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing
Commission; (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct; and” (7) “the
need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense.”112
A sentencing court is charged with the careful consideration of the
aforementioned

factors

to

ultimately

produce

“a

sentence

sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes set forth in the provision.”113
In two early post-Booker cases, United States v. Webb and
United States v. Jackson, the Sixth Circuit attempted to establish
the parameters of reasonableness review pursuant to the advisory
Guidelines.114

Both cases emphasized the comprehensive nature of

the § 3553(a) factors; the Webb court specifically stated:
[W]e read Booker as instructing appellate courts in
determining reasonableness to consider not only the
length of the sentence but also the factors evaluated and
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the procedures employed by the district court in reaching
its sentencing determination. Thus, we may conclude that
a sentence is unreasonable when the district judge fails
to “consider” the applicable Guidelines range or neglects
to “consider” the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), and instead simply selects what the judge deems
an
appropriate
sentence
without
such
required
consideration.[115]
The circuit was, however, quick to emphasize that although a
district

court’s

facilitates

discussion

appellate

of

review,

specific

“[the

Sixth

§

3553(a)

Circuit]

factors

has

never

required the ‘ritual incantation’ of the factors to affirm a
sentence.”116

Instead,

the

circuit

reviews

challenges

for

procedural unreasonableness on a case-by-case basis,117 during which
it must be capable of engaging “in a meaningful reasonableness
review of federal criminal sentences in accordance with Booker.”118
Although
undoubtedly

§

3553

still

Guidelines range.119

lists

carries

several
the

most

factors,
weight

the
is

factor
the

that

advisory

Indeed, in United States v. Williams,120 the

circuit “join[ed] several sister circuits in crediting sentences
properly

calculated

under

the

presumption of reasonableness.”121

Guidelines

with

a

rebuttable

This, according to Williams, did

not obviate the duty of a sentencing court to consider all of the
relevant § 3553(a) factors, although, again, a “ritual incantation”
of the factors remained unnecessary.122

The circuit proceeded to

clarify Williams by subsequently stating in United States v.
Foreman that “Williams does not mean that a sentence outside of the
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Guidelines range –- either higher or lower -– is presumptively
unreasonable.

It is not.

Williams does not mean that a Guidelines

sentence will be found reasonable in the absence of evidence in the
record that the district court considered all of the relevant
section 3553(a) factors.”123

Although the Foreman court approved of

the presumption of reasonableness afforded to within-Guidelines
sentences, it also emphasized the importance of a district court’s
analysis of the § 3553(a) factors alongside meaningful appellate
review, insisting that the presumption was not “an excuse for an
appellate court to abdicate any semblance of meaningful review.”124
In United States v. Richardson, the Sixth Circuit continued
the expansion of Williams.125

Reiterating “that a sentence within

the appropriate advisory Guideline range should be credited with a
presumption of reasonableness,” the court stated nonetheless that:
We emphasize the obligation of the district court in each
case to communicate clearly its rationale for imposing
the specific sentence.
Where a defendant raises a
particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the
record must reflect both that the district judge
considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge
explained the basis for rejecting it. This assures not
only that the defendant can understand the basis for the
particular sentence but also that the reviewing court can
intelligently determine whether the specific sentence is
indeed reasonable.[126]
In United States v. Vonner, the Sixth Circuit restated the
procedural
language.127

principles

of

Williams

cloaked

in

even

broader

There, the court reviewed a sentence where “[t]he only

proof in the record of the district court’s consideration is the
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district court’s statement that ‘[w]ith respect to the sentence in
this case, the Court has considered the nature and circumstances of
the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
advisory Guideline range, as well as the other factors listed in
the 18 United States 3553(a).’”128
court’s

perfunctory

admonished:
claims

analysis

The circuit found the district
“unreasonable”

and

therefore

“This type of offhanded dismissal of a defendant’s

provides

mere

lip

service

to

the

district

court’s

responsibility to carefully weigh all the facts and provide a
defendant

with

decision.”129

a

well-reasoned,

well-thought-out

sentencing

In short, it concluded, when a defendant has raised a

specific argument or consideration to be considered under the §
3553(a) factors, the sentencing court must proffer an “adequate
explanation” for its acceptance or rejection of those arguments.130
4.

The Diminished Effect.

This litany of Sixth Circuit cases illustrates several points.
At a minimum, the Sixth Circuit has attempted to bolster the
continued reliance upon the Guidelines’ calculation with firm
rhetoric, arguably establishing a measure of precedent and assuring
more consistent expectations of the standard of review for both
defendants and sentencing courts.

And, although Booker and Blakely

emphasized

problem

the

constitutional

with

construing

the

Guidelines as a mandatory sentencing system, the aforementioned
reactions by sentencing courts reflect that the Guidelines continue
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to

prevent

those

courts

from

balancing

determinate

and

indeterminate sentencing considerations.
As a first step, a sentencing court must still calculate the
Guidelines precisely as before, thereby engaging in substantial
judicial factfinding.

If a pre-Booker sentencing court was savvy

enough to alternatively recommend an identical-to-the-Guidelines
shadow sentence, that sentence is readily affirmed.

Additionally,

any sentence within the Guidelines range is afforded a presumption
of reasonableness.

Despite the Sixth Circuit’s rhetorical efforts

to imbue this presumption with requiring evidence of discretionary
language, the effect remains the same:

the federal sentencing

system remains primarily a determinate scheme buttressed by heavy
presumptions.

This

is

evident

in

post-Booker

statistics.

According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s post-Booker report,
“only one circuit court has held a properly calculated guideline
sentence to be unreasonable,”131 and “[n]o circuit court has upheld
a below range sentence granted on the basis of either a prohibited
factor or the defendant’s cooperation without a government motion
having been filed.”132
Put simply, the judicial response to Booker has slowed any
movement

toward

a

more

balanced

determinate/indeterminate

sentencing system and has instead redirected sentencing courts to
rely on the applicable advisory Guidelines’ range.

Although

notable commentaries have approved of continuing to afford the
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advisory Guidelines’ range a substantial amount of weight in
sentencing determinations,133 even those commentaries have lamented
the inherent danger in such presumptive weight:

the abdication of

the exercise of meaningful independent judgment in favor of a predetermined calculation.134
With this conundrum in mind, Part III of this paper provides
an overview of Maine’s criminal sentencing scheme both before and
after Booker via the example of the well-publicized case, State v.
Schofield.
III.
Like the federal system, Maine’s pre-Blakely/Booker sentencing
procedure presented a dilemma identical in almost every material
respect to that presented by the Guidelines.
pronouncement
sentencing

of

scheme

the

Blakely

frequently

and

Booker

obligated

Indeed, before the
decisions,

sentencing

Maine’s

judges

to

determine, by preponderance, whether a defendant’s conduct was
sufficiently heinous to merit an enhanced sentence.

That is,

however, the only similarity between the two sentencing systems; as
detailed below, Maine’s response to the Supreme Court’s landmark
decisions reflects a common sense approach that carefully balances
several

statutorily

simultaneously
judges.

affording

enumerated
much-needed

sentencing
discretion

goals
to

while

sentencing

In doing so, Maine appropriately moved toward a more

balanced determinate / indeterminate scheme which, unlike the
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current federal approach, serves to adequately individualize each
defendant’s sentence.
1.
In

Maine’s Statutory Sentencing Framework.
1976,

Maine

adopted

its

Criminal

Code

and

thereby

eliminated indeterminate sentences by establishing a three-part
procedure for sentencing criminal defendants.135

Specifically, the

three-part sentencing procedure first required a court to set the
basic term of imprisonment “by considering the particular nature
and seriousness of the offense as committed by the offender.”136
Secondarily, a sentencing court had to “determine the maximum
period of imprisonment to be imposed by considering all other
relevant

sentencing

factors,

appropriate to that case.”137

both

aggravating

and

mitigating,

“Mitigating factors may include those

that demonstrate a low potential of reoffending, and aggravating
factors may include those that demonstrate a high probability of
reoffending.”138

During this second step, “the court [had to] apply

its discretion to determine the degree of mitigation called for by
the circumstances of the offender and the degree of aggravation
indicated

by

specific

re-offending.”139

factors

demonstrating

a

high

risk

of

Doing so enabled the court to “appropriately

individualize each sentence.”140
Finally, at step three, a sentencing court analyzed whether
any portion “of the maximum period of imprisonment should be
suspended and, if a suspension order is to be entered, determine
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the

appropriate

suspension.”141

period

of

probation

to

accompany

that

At this third step, “the court [could] suspend a

portion of the period of maximum incarceration when, for example,
the court determines that society will better be protected by
affording a period of supervised probation of an offender.”142

Not

counterpart,143

was

unlike

its

additionally

federal
guided

by

the

any

following

Maine

sentence

statutorily

enumerated

“purposes”:
1.

To prevent crime through the deterrent effect of
sentences, the rehabilitation of convicted persons,
and the restraint of convicted persons when
required in the interest of public safety;

2.

To encourage restitution in all cases in which the
victim can be compensated and other purposes of
sentencing can be appropriately served.

3.

To minimize correctional experiences which serve to
promote further criminality;

4.

To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences
that may be imposed on the conviction of a crime;

5.

To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are
unrelated to legitimate criminological goals;

6.

To encourage differentiation among offenders with a
view to a just individualization of sentences;

7.

To promote the development of correctional programs
which elicit the cooperation of convicted persons;
and

8.

To permit sentences that do not diminish the
gravity of offenses, with reference to the factors,
among others, of:
A.

The age of the victim; and
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B.

The selection by the defendant of the
person against whom the crime was
committed or of the property that was
damaged or otherwise affected by the
crime because of the race, color,
religion, sex, ancestry, national origin,
physical or mental disability or sexual
orientation of that person or of the
owner or occupant of that property.[144]

The Maine Criminal Code also established corresponding maximum
periods of imprisonment for each class of crime.

Specifically,

Maine’s Criminal Code set the maximum term of imprisonment for
serious crimes, other than murder,145 and categorized them into
Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E.146

Years later, in

1988, a divided Judiciary Committee proposed that the punishment
solely for Class A crimes be doubled.147

The Committee, however,

specified that their proposal would not apply to all Class A
crimes; instead, the amendment would apply only to those defendants
receiving close-to-maximum sentences for “‘the most heinous and
violent crimes that are committed against a person.’”148

Following

the bill’s approval, enacted at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A), the
maximum sentence for Class A crimes was increased from twenty to
forty years.149
2.

Heading toward a Booker problem:
The promulgation of
Maine’s two-tier sentencing for “the most heinous and
violent crimes.”

Following the promulgation of section 1252(2)(A), the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) concluded, in State v. Lewis,150 that
“the [Legislature’s] intent was to make available two discrete
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ranges of sentences for Class A crimes.”151

Thus, ordinarily, a

defendant who committed a Class A crime would receive a sentence
below twenty years.152

Consistent with the language embodied by the

1988 sentencing amendment, however, a finding by a preponderance
that the defendant’s crime constituted one of “the most heinous and
violent

crimes

committed

against

a

person”

would

enable

the

sentencing court to “in its discretion consider imposing a basic
sentence within the expanded range of twenty to forty years.”153
Significantly, a trial court was tasked with determining whether a
defendant’s crime merited an upper-tier sentence at the first step
of the sentencing process; i.e., when setting the basic term of
imprisonment.154

As a result, “[c]ircumstances of the offender, or

other circumstances unrelated to the nature and seriousness of the
offense, [could not] elevate the maximum period of incarceration
beyond twenty years when the crime itself is not within the
extended range of Class A crimes.”155

Indeed, as noted, only at

step two was a court permitted to consider the factors peculiar to
offending defendant.156
With that structure in mind, sentencing judges were frequently
required to make findings at step one to determine in which “zone”
a Class A offender should be sentenced.157

To determine whether a

particular defendant’s conduct was sufficiently “heinous” to merit
an upper-tier penalty, a sentencing court was instructed to compare
the commission of that defendant’s act to “all of the possible
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means of committing the offenses on a scale reflecting degrees of
seriousness[.]”158

If “defendant’s conduct would cause his offenses

to rank high on that scale[,]” then a sentence in the upper
quadrant of the sentencing range was appropriate.159

A sentencing

court was invited to consider facts outside the record and,160 most
importantly,

whether

the

commission

of

defendant’s

crime

was

accompanied by extreme violence or serious physical injury.161
Notably, however, a non-violent crime could qualify for an extended
sentence so long as it was sufficiently heinous.162

The defendant

who possesses a litany of prior convictions could likewise receive
an enhanced sentence.163
With the foregoing principles in mind, the SJC has affirmed
sentences

in

the

upper-tier

imposed

upon

defendants

who

(1)

savagely attacked the victim with a knife and subsequently left the
victim to die in the woods;164 (2) for two years, used alcohol,
drugs, gifts, money, and pornography to lure and groom thirteen and
fourteen-year-old

boys

into

sexual

relationships;165

and

(3)

possessed a criminal history including killing a prison inmate,
injuring a prison guard, and stabbing five people during a prison
riot.166

Conversely, the court viewed close-to maximum sentences to

be inappropriate for (1) sexual assaults “in cases that involve
neither a weapon, nor a heightened degree of violence, injury,
torture,

or

depravity[;]”167

(2)

arson

apparent motive,168 and (3) drug sales.169
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committed

without

any

3.

Confronting Booker:

The impact of State v. Schofield.

Maine’s upper/lower tier sentencing scheme was dramatically
reformed

in

State

v.

Schofield.170

The

court’s

opinion

in

Schofield, which followed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely
and Booker, addressed the constitutionality of a sentencing judge’s
statutory power to determine, pursuant to section 1252(2)(A),
whether a particular defendant’s conduct was sufficiently “heinous”
to merit an upper-tier penalty.

In addition to being a watershed

case from a legal perspective, the unique facts giving rise to
Sally Schofield’s criminal prosecution, recounted below, sparked an
unprecedented amount of media coverage.171
Defendant Sally Schofield worked as a caseworker in Maine’s
Department of Human Services (“DHS”) from the early 1990s until
November of 2000.172

As Schofield discharged her responsibilities

as a DHS caseworker in 1996, Christy Marr gave birth to her
troubled daughter, Logan.173

Christy, then a teenaged mother,

immediately had difficulty raising Logan and, as a result, Christy
moved in with her mother.174
Christy’s
Logan.175

maturity

and

Her mother, however, had doubts about

overall

ability

to

effectively

parent

Christy’s mother called DHS to report her concern; DHS

records reflect her initial concern that “Christy can’t or won’t
put Logan’s needs before her own.

[Christy’s mother] said that

Christy screams and hollers at the baby all the time and handles
her

extremely

roughly.”176

Those
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concerns

culminated

in

the

removal, by DHS, of then two-and-a-half-year-old Logan into state
custody

from

Christy

while

she

was

pregnant

with

her

second

child.177
After

the

birth

of

her

new

baby

girl,

Bailey,

Christy

temporarily revamped her life and persuaded DHS of her fitness as a
mother to care for both Logan and Bailey.178

Her ability care for

Logan and Bailey, however, did not last; both children were removed
from Christy’s care because, according to DHS, Christy became
romantically involved with an accused sex offender who allegedly
hit Christy in front of Logan.179

DHS therefore again removed Logan

into state custody, this time including Bailey, and placed the pair
in the care of their second foster mother.180

Almost immediately

after her second placement in foster care, Logan began acting out
by throwing angry temper-tantrums, which often included physical
outrages.181
Commensurate with the foster mother’s struggles with Logan’s
behavior, Schofield, who was still employed by DHS, began to
consider adopting a female child of her own.182

Although Schofield

had two boys of her own, and DHS discouraged its caseworkers from
adopting children from within the system, Schofield nonetheless
obtained custody over Logan and Bailey in September of 2000.183
Only a few short months after her placement with Schofield, Logan
began exhibiting intensely verbal and physical outrages similar to
those she displayed with her previous foster mother.184
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As Logan’s

outbursts

further

“progressively

intensified,185

longer

time-out

Schofield

periods,

began

which

often

invoking
involved

covering Logan with a blanket, or lying on top of her while
bargaining with Logan for the release of one limb at a time.”186
The struggle between Schofield and Logan ended with Logan’s
death on January 31, 2001, as a snowstorm raged outside.187

At home

on that afternoon, Logan’s behavior intensified to such an extent
that Schofield took Logan down the basement stairs where Schofield
placed five-year-old Logan in a high chair behind a blanket curtain
facing

a

concrete

wall.188

ostensibly to cook dinner.189

Schofield

then

returned

upstairs

A subsequent investigation of what

soon became a crime scene revealed that Schofield did not simply
leave Logan in her high chair; instead, as the sentencing court
recounted:
[Schofield] secured Logan to the high chair by wrapping
layers of duct tape around Logan’s torso and behind the
back of the chair to prevent her from getting out. To
silence her screams she wrapped more duct tape under her
chin, over her head and across her mouth. Having already
violated the [Department] rules of discipline by physical
confinement, Ms. Schofield then left Logan to struggle
against her bonds in isolation.[190]
All told, Schofield wrapped forty-two feet of duct tape over
Logan’s mouth and upper lip.191

Shortly after Logan’s screams went

silent, Schofield went to the basement to check on Logan, after
which she called 9-1-1.192

Although Logan was rushed to the

hospital, she was pronounced dead soon thereafter.193
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That night, the police interviewed Schofield, who claimed that
Logan was not restrained in her high chair.194

Detectives, however,

uncovered evidence to the contrary when searching Schofield’s home;
indeed, they recovered the duct tape which Schofield removed prior
to

the

arrival

of

medical

personnel.195

Forensic

tests

then

confirmed that “three layers of tape had been placed over Logan’s
mouth and upper lip, as evidenced by a bloody froth from Logan’s
congested lungs, with a DNA match to Logan, and tiny mustache hairs
directly above the bloody stain . . . .”196

Although, after police

confronted Schofield with this new evidence, she initially claimed
that Logan tangled herself in the duct tape,197 her story ultimately
crumbled and she was indicted for depraved indifference murder in
violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(B) (1983), and manslaughter in
violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203(1)(A).198
Although, during Schofield’s jury-waived trial held in June
2002, the trial court granted her motion for acquittal on the
charge of depraved indifference murder, the court ultimately found
Schofield guilty of manslaughter.199

At her subsequent sentencing

hearing, the court imposed upon Schofield a sentence in excess of
twenty years pursuant to section 1252(2)(A) because, the court
found, Schofield’s crime was sufficiently “heinous” to merit an
upper-tier sentence.

The court stated:

It became a test of wills between Logan and Sally, and
Sally Schofield was determined to win out. She couldn’t
accept the fact that a five-year-old Logan might get the
best of her. And yet despite all of her training and all
35

of her experience and knowledge of children in foster
care and her awareness of the rules and regulations, she
acted recklessly when she restrained Logan in the
basement to fight her bonds in solitude and silence.
The situation developed over time, and the conduct
leading to the actual death, however, did not happen in a
momentary lapse. The defendant’s conduct in restraining
Logan recklessly led to her death. At any time during
the process of restraining her she could’ve closed the
door instead of putting the gag around her. She could’ve
turned up the radio if she wanted to drown out the sounds
of Logan making noise and yelling.
Putting her in
restraints was against the rules and regulations of the
placement. But even if she had done that, by placing the
duct tape around the head and as was disclosed-described
as clamping her mouth shut, Logan had no chance.
This case is most serious, and the Court believes that
the base sentence in this case falls in the 20 to 25-year
range. With the enhancement called for in the death of a
child under the age of six, the Court fixes the base
sentence at 28 years.[200]
In

the

next

steps

of

the

sentencing

process,

the

court

declined to make any adjustment to the base sentence and thereafter
(1) suspended eight years of the twenty-eight-year sentence,201 and
(2) ordered Schofield to serve six years of probation following the
completion of her prison term.202

The SJC granted Schofield leave

to appeal her sentence.203
On appeal, the SJC considered, in pertinent part, whether an
upper-tier sentence determination must be made by a jury.

After

reviewing both the Blakely and Booker decisions, the court held
that section 1252(2)(A) could not be constitutionally applied to
Schofield’s sentencing.

In the critical portion of its analysis,

the court stated as follows:
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As we have already noted, section 1252(2)(A) required a
finding that Schofield’s crime was “among the most
heinous crimes committed against a person” before a
sentence exceeding twenty years could be imposed. That
fact was not pleaded in Schofield’s indictment as an
element of the offense of manslaughter, was not admitted
by Schofield, and was not determined beyond a reasonable
doubt by the fact-finder.
For these reasons, section
1252(2)(A) cannot be constitutionally applied without
affording the defendant an opportunity to have the
fact-finder of her choice, judge or jury, determine
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the crime was among
the most heinous offenses committed against a person.[204]
In

thereafter

approving

of

the

use

of

“jury

sentencing”

to

determine any fact necessary to enhance Schofield’s sentence, the
court vacated her original sentence and remanded with instructions
for the sentencing court to provide Schofield with “the opportunity
for a sentencing trial before the fact-finder of her choice (i.e.,
judge or jury).”205

The court concluded by observing that, on

remand, Schofield’s sentence may properly be enhanced only if her
chosen

fact-finder

determines

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt

that

Schofield’s offense is among the most heinous committed against a
person.206
4.

Sentencing after Schofield.

Although the court’s holding in Schofield undoubtedly affected
defendants whose sentences were enhanced pursuant to the two-tier
system,207 its impact was significantly limited by the legislature’s
preemptive amendment to section 1252(2)(A) in 2004.208

At that

time, the legislature revised the language of section 1252(2)(A) to
read that, “[i]n the case of a Class A crime, the court shall set a
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definite period not to exceed 30 years.”209
indicated

in

its

statement

eliminate

a

‘constitutional

of

fact

cloud’

that

“This legislation
it

created

was

designed

to

by

Apprendi

by

eliminating what it characterized as the two-tier system and
replacing it with ‘a single 0- to 30-year range.’”210

Quite

evidently ahead of its time, that amendment enabled the legislature
to cut off the potential flood of defendants impacted by Schofield
by wholly eliminating the two “zones” of sentencing and replacing
it with a 0-30 year range.
Thus, were Schofield sentenced today, the sentence court would
be confined simply to the 0-30 range provided by revised section
1252(2)(A).

To reach an appropriate sentence for Schofield, the

court would continue to follow the three-step Hewey analysis.
Accordingly, the court would (1) set a basic term of imprisonment,
(2) consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and (3)
determine whether any portion of the sentence should be suspended.
By providing such a procedure, Maine has sought to protect the
legislature’s interest in reducing sentencing disparity at step one
(i.e., by mandating a specific sentencing range for a particular
class of crime), while simultaneously ensuring that each defendant
will receive the benefit of genuine judicial discretion at step
two.
IV.
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Notwithstanding its complexity, the Maine sentencing system
provides what is, in essence, a three-step checklist for the
sentencing court to follow.
variety

of

statutorily

Built into that list is, of course, a
enumerated

sentencing

purposes.

Accordingly, the sentencing judge who closely adheres to each step
appropriately individualizes each defendant’s punishment while
simultaneously seeking to achieve uniformity in sentencing.

The

ultimate sentence therefore reflects a balance of determinate and
indeterminate components.

Importantly, in Maine, uniformity does

not trump individualization; so long as the requisite “checklist”
is adhered to, sentencing courts in Maine retain substantial
discretion to tailor the sentence to the individual defendant.
a

result,

a

properly

imposed

sentence

in

Maine

is

met

As

with

extraordinary deference, thereby conserving judicial resources.
Admittedly, the federal sentencing Guidelines were initially
drafted to accomplish nearly identical goals.

Indeed, at the

outset of their promulgation, the Guidelines were designed to
provide district courts with at least some limited discretion.
Under the guise of seeking to avoid inequality in sentencing,
however,

the

federal

appellate

judiciary’s

application

and

interpretation of the Guidelines has slowly divested whatever
remaining discretion sentencing courts possessed when imposing a
sentence

pursuant

sentencing

courts

to
are

the

Guidelines.

tacitly
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charged

Indeed,
with

after

adhering

Booker,
to

the

recommended Guidelines range or risking reversal.

The result, as

documented in Part II by reference to opinions authored by the
Sixth Circuit, reflects a gradual shift toward a sentencing regime
dedicated almost exclusively to determinate sentencing.
The merits of a determinate, as opposed to an indeterminate,
sentencing system, have long been debated.211
advocate

in

favor

of

determinate

sentencing

In sum, those who
contend

that

it

provides equality in punishment while simultaneously limiting the
unpredictable application of judicial discretion.212

Conversely,

proponents of indeterminate sentencing highlight that equitable
punishments arise not from across-the-board mandatory sentences,
but rather from the uniform application of certain sentencing
principles.213

Although patently divergent, the foregoing arguments

reflect one glaring similarity:

regardless of whether one favors

indeterminate or determinate sentencing, both camps seek to avoid
an unwarranted disparity in sentencing.

This Article has not

sought to advocate on behalf of either indeterminate or determinate
sentencing but, instead, has assumed that the ultimate goal of any
sentencing scheme is to avoid inequitable sentencing.
To that end, a comprehensive examination of the history of
federal

sentencing,

as

counterparts, is needed.

well

as

an

examination

of

its

state

As discussed in Part II, the Sixth

Circuit’s various approaches to sentencing – the presumption of
reasonableness, shadow sentences, and judicial fact-finding for
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enhancements

–

serve

merely

to

unconstitutionally

streamline

federal sentencing procedures by distracting federal judges from
their duty to impose individualized sentences upon every defendant
who enters their courtroom.
remains

is

currently

To worsen matters, whatever discretion

being

absorbed

by

the

growing

trend

of

appellate courts to reverse a sentencing court’s decision to grant
to defendants a downward departure.214 Thus, although the current
state

of

federal

sentencing

procedures

outwardly

purports

to

possess indeterminate and determinate components, the practical
reality of federal sentencing reflects an unwavering addiction to
the narrow ranges proscribed by the Guidelines.
In contrast, this Article has proffered that the combination
of the Maine legislature’s revision of the two-tiered approach
previously endorsed by section 1252(2)(A) alongside the Sixth
Amendment boundary imposed by the Schofield opinion serve as an
interesting window through which to view a proposed response to the
Supreme Court’s Blakely and Booker decisions.

Notably, that

response differs starkly from that endorsed by the Sixth Circuit.
Indeed, unlike the Sixth Circuit’s tacit return to pre-Booker
sentencing

procedures,

sentencing

system

sentencing

judges

Maine’s

marks

mixed

clear

while

determinate/indeterminate

constitutional
simultaneously

individualization of each defendant’s sentence.
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boundaries

for

ensuring

the

Further to blame is the federal judiciary’s current approach
to reviewing sentences.
reviews

post-Booker

As noted, a circuit court typically

sentences

for

“reasonableness.”215

The

“reasonableness” standard of review is at best confusing and, at
worst, an invitation to consider a panoply of additional, often
pre-Booker,216 corresponding standards of review.217

Indeed, lying

beneath the topical reasonableness standard exists, for example,
(1)

a

de

novo

approach

to

reviewing

asserted

errors

in

the

application of the Guidelines,218 (2) a clearly erroneous standard
applicable

to

appellate

imposition

of

standard

applicable

an

challenges

enhancement,219
to

a

and

to
(3)

a

sentencing
a

defendant’s

clearly

court’s
erroneous

acceptance

of

responsibility.220
Grounded in the notion that the sentencing court is better
able to evaluate the circumstances of each particular defendant,221
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court employs a far more workable,
albeit complex, and deferential two-step standard when reviewing
sentences.222

Perhaps the best example of Maine’s deferential

approach exists at the outset; indeed, a three-judge panel of the
Supreme Judicial Court must first grant a defendant leave to review
his or her sentence before the entire court will consider any
asserted error in sentencing.223

Assuming discretionary leave is

granted,224 the court reviews the lower court’s determination of the
defendant’s basic period of incarceration for “misapplication of
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principle.”225

In doing so, the court accords “great deference” to

(1) “the weight and effect given by the court to those factors
peculiar to a particular offender in its determination of the
offender’s maximum period of incarceration[,]” and (2) “the court’s
determination whether to suspend any portion of that maximum period
in arriving at the final sentence imposed on the offender by the
court.”226

Accordingly, as the court stated in State v. Hewey:

Because of the two different standards applicable in our
review of the sentencing process, the desirability of a
clear articulation by the trial court of its compliance
with the three-step procedure becomes apparent. This
articulation will aid us not only in distinguishing and
applying the appropriate standard of appellate review, -i.e., the misapplication of principle standard to a trial
court’s determination of the basic sentence and a
standard of considerable deference to its determinations
of the maximum and final sentences -- but it will also
facilitate a greater degree of uniformity in the
sentencing process.[227]
Then, after determining that each individual step in the Hewey
process was correctly applied, the court reviews the sentence in
its entirety for an abuse of discretion.228
No such process exists at the federal level.

Consequently,

the unfortunate likely result of the federal judiciary’s erosion of
the Booker ideals seems an unavoidable return to the pre-Booker
discontent recounted at the outset of this Article.

Before that

happens, we should reconsider the role of Guidelines in federal
sentencing, and the sentencing commission would do well to examine
the long history of sentencing in this county, as well as evolution
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of sentencing in its state counterparts.

Rather than respond to

the Booker decision extremely by, for example, abolishing the
Guidelines
mandatory,229

in
we

toto

or,

should

conversely,

specifically

making

consider

them

entirely

reevaluating

the

weight to be accorded the Guidelines when sentencing federal
defendants.

We should correspondingly limit undue reliance on the

Guidelines when reviewing the actions of a sentencing court on
appeal.

The most immediate consequence of such a proposal would,

at a minimum, require appellate courts to abandon the “presumption
of reasonableness” already coveted by so many circuits.

Then, from

a long-term perspective, the judiciary should consider gradually
moving toward a model not unlike Maine’s system.

Doing so would,

ironically, better suit the original goals as outlined by the
sentencing commission, better comport with the historical evolution
of sentencing in this country and, ultimately, achieve a more
reasonable

balance

between

determinate

and

indeterminate

sentencing.
1. The Sixth Circuit humorously stated in a recent opinion
that “[a]chieving agreement between the circuit courts and within
each circuit on post-Booker issues has, unfortunately, been like
trying to herd bullfrogs into a wheelbarrow.” United States v.
McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2006).
2. Greg Gittrich, WTC Judge Quits Bench, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June
25, 2003. In connection with his resignation, Judge Martin also
observed that, “[f]or a judge to be deprived of the ability to
consider all of the factors that go into formulating a just
sentence is completely at odds with the sentencing philosophy that
has been a hallmark of the American system of justice.” John S.
Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at
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A31.
3. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, Supreme Court,
Keynote Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
(Aug. 9, 2003).
SMART

4. FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, ARIZONA PRISON CRISIS: A CALL FOR
CRIME SOLUTIONS (2004), http://famm.org/pdfs/AZreportFINAL.pdf.

ON

5. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
2004: AN EXPERIMENT THAT HAS FAILED 35 (2004).
6. ERIK LUNA, MISGUIDED GUIDELINES: A CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING, Pol’y
Analysis No. 458, 24 (2002), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa458.pdf.
Perhaps the truest precursor to the Guidelines’ failure began with
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989), the decision upholding the constitutionality of the
sentencing commission and its Guidelines. In his scathing dissent,
Justice Scalia observed that “the Court errs, in other words, not so
much because it mistakes the degree of commingling, but because it
fails to recognize that this case is not about commingling, but
about the creation of a new Branch altogether, a sort of junior
varsity Congress.”
Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting); United
States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J., dissenting) (noting some lines drawn by the Guidelines “seem
crazy” and “loony”).
7. For an impressive compilation of authorities dissecting and
criticizing the Guidelines, see the 177-page opinion authored by
Chief Judge William Young of the U.S. District Court of the District
of Massachusetts who, before the issuance of Blakely, ruled that the
logic of Apprendi and Ring rendered the federal sentencing
guidelines unconstitutional. United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp.
2d 259 (D. Mass. 2004).
8. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Maureen O’Hagan, Lawyers try to sort out effects
of court ruling on sentencing, THE SEATTLE TIMES, June 26, 2004,
available
at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
localnews/2001966086_judges26m.html;
Adam
Liptak,
Sentencing
Decision’s Reach Is Far and Wide, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/27/politics/27sentencing.html; David
G. Savage, Thousands Of Cases In Doubt After Decision On Sentencing,
THE
LOS
ANGELES
TIMES,
June
26,
2004,
available
at
http://www.november.org/Blakely/LATimes6-26-04.html.
10. United States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (subsequent history omitted).
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11. United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2004)
(subsequent history omitted).
12. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (“Any
fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established
by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
13. Id. at 245.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 261
addition to the past
involving departures,
familiar to appellate

(“And in this instance those factors, in
two decades of appellate practice in cases
imply a practical standard of review already
courts: review for “unreasonable[ness].”).

16. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (E.D. Wis.
2005) (“District courts cannot just add up figures and pick a number
within a narrow range.
Rather, they must consider all of the
applicable factors, listen carefully to defense and government
counsel, and sentence the person before them as an individual.”);
see, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005)
(attempting to provide general guidance to district courts and
noting district court cannot satisfy duty to consider Guidelines by
general reference to them); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369,
382 & n.5 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that facts supporting an
enhancement existed, such that enhancement could be applied, but
leaving it to district court as to whether it ought to be applied
now that Guidelines are advisory); United States v. Cano-Silva, 402
F.3d 1031, 1039 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Under Booker, the Sentencing
Guidelines are no longer mandatory, and the district judge will be
free to determine whether the defendant is eligible for a minor-role
adjustment without any concern that the result would compel what the
judge considers an unwarranted sentence.”).
17. United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 530 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“Because we are convinced that sentencing Barnett under mandatory
Guidelines ‘seriously affected the fairness, integrity and public
reputation of judicial proceedings,’ . . . now that we know those
Guidelines are advisory, we exercise our discretion to notice the
plain sentencing error in the present case and vacate Barnett's
sentence.” (citation omitted)); but see United States v. Mares, 402
F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005) (requiring defendants to demonstrate
prejudice from the application of mandatory guidelines (the
reasonable probability of a different outcome) to satisfy the third
step of plain-error review).
18. Several Circuits now view a district court’s sentence
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within the Guidelines as per se reasonable.
See, e.g., United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341-44 (4th Cir. 2006) (adopting
and exploring justifications for presumption of reasonableness);
United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“If the
sentencing judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence
within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness
review we will infer that the judge has considered all the factors
for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines.”); United States v.
Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We now join several
sister circuits in crediting sentences properly calculated under the
Guidelines with a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.”);
United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The
best way to express the new balance, in our view, is to acknowledge
that any sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines
is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.”); United
States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[Defendant’s]
sentence . . . was within the guidelines range for his offense level
of 38 and criminal history category IV, and as a result, we think
that it is presumptively reasonable.”); United States v. Kristl, 437
F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d
784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding properly calculated guidelines
sentence “ordinarily” will be reasonable); but cf. United States v.
Rubenstein, 403 F.3d 93, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2005) (Cardamone, J.,
concurring) (“Correct application of the Guidelines is but one
factor to be considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 in reviewing
reasonableness . . . and it is entirely possible that a correctly
calculated Guidelines sentence might nonetheless be found
unreasonable upon consideration of other factors.
(citation
omitted)).
19. 543 U.S. at 244. Although, as the Court observed, “jury
factfinding may impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing
of defendants,” the judiciary’s common interest “in fairness and
reliability protected by the right to a jury trial--a common-law
right that defendants enjoyed for centuries and that is now
enshrined in the Sixth Amendment --has always outweighed the
interest in concluding trials swiftly.” Id.
20. United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 352 (6th Cir. 2005)
(Cook, J., concurring) (noting “judges may enhance sentences based
upon facts not found by the jury, provided they do not consider
themselves required to do so”). As discussed more fully below, such
a statement of the post-Booker law appears wholly incorrect; to the
extent that judicial fact-finding remains after Booker, it must be
preceded by jury involvement or an admission by the defendant.
21. United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir.
2005) (reaffirming, notwithstanding Booker, that “relevant conduct
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of which a defendant was acquitted nonetheless may be taken into
account in sentencing for the offense of conviction, as long as the
government proves the acquitted conduct relied upon by a
preponderance of the evidence” (quoting United States v. Barakat,
130 F.3d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1997)).
22. 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002). Thus, not only must all facts
increasing the Guidelines range for the offense of conviction be
submitted the jury or admitted by the defendant, they must also be
charged by the grand jury in the indictment. Id.
23. Significantly, a leading academic chronicler of sentencing
decisions believes “the Sixth Circuit is doing some of the best
post-Booker work of any of the circuits.”
Professor Douglas A.
Berman, Strong Booker work from the Sixth Circuit, Sentencing Law
and
Policy,
at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2006/week21/
index.html/ (May 26, 2006).
24. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (quoting 4 COMMENTARIES
ENGLAND 343-344 (1769))

ON THE

LAWS

OF

25. For a more comprehensive chronicle, see SANDRA SHANE-DUBOW ET.
SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT
(1985).
AL.,

26. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)
(“For almost a century, the Federal Government employed in criminal
cases a system of indeterminate sentencing[,] . . . [which] nearly
always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide whether
the offender should be incarcerated and for how long, whether he
should be fined and how much, and whether some lesser restraint,
such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or
fine.”).
27. See United States v. Wynn, 11 F. 57 (E.D. Mo. 1882); see
also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 223, 226 n.8 (1993) (discussing the lack of appellate
review excepting a “brief period in the late 19th Century[,]” during
which a federal provision was interpreted to permit “appellate
courts to consider not only whether the sentence imposed was
lawful--within statutory limitations--but also whether it was
excessive, and, if so, to modify it”).
28. See Douglas A. Berman, Beyond Blakely and Booker:
Pondering Modern Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653,
654-55 (2005) (discussing medical origins of “rehabilitative ideal,”
which viewed the offender as a “sick” individual who might be
“cured”).
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29. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363.
30. Id.
31. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
32. Id. at 242-44.
33. Id. at 245-48.
34. Id. at 247.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 249.
37. For further discussion of the interplay in the following
decades between rehabilitative motivations and constitutional
procedure in Supreme Court decisions, see Douglas A. Berman,
Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J., 6-8 (2006).
38. Stith & Koh, supra note 27, at 227.
39. Id. (citations omitted); see Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring
Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895-97 (1990) (highlighting particular
incidences and studies of disparate sentences).
40. Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for
Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2044 (1992); see MARVIN E.
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972).
41. J. Edgar Hoover, The Dire Consequences of the Premature
Release of Dangerous Criminals Through Probation and Parole, 27
F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1 (1958).
42. Minnesota created a Sentencing Guidelines Commission in
1978. See RICHARD S. FRASE, SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN MINNESOTA, 1978-2003 3
(2003),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=623281.
Pennsylvania
and
Washington soon followed suit.
See 204 PA. CODE § 303 (1982)
(codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (West 1982)); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.94A.040 (West 1988).
43. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1987 (1984).
44. For a more detailed discussion of penal philosophies within
the Sentencing Reform Act’s legislative history, see Stith & Koh,
supra note 27, at 239, and see 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (outlining the
duties of the sentencing commission and specifically rejecting
rehabilitation as a goal of imprisonment).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988).
46. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553 requires that the sentence court to
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consider, inter alia, the following factors:
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and
(D)
to
provide
the
defendant
with
needed
educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner[.]
Id. § 3553(a)(2).
47. Professor Berman contends that the lack of procedural
guidance in state and federal sentencing guidelines immediately
resulted in conceptual chaos. Berman, supra note 4, at 659-61.
48. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 (1992)
(providing that Federal Rules of Evidence would not apply at
sentencing proceedings; information was permissible providing that
there was “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy”).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) (“No limitation shall be placed on
the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of
a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.”).
50. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
51. Id. at 81-82 n.1.
52. Id. at 91.
53. Id.
54. Berman, supra note 4, at 665-66 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Wright, 494 A.2d 354, 362 (Pa. 1985)).
55. 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
56. Id. at 156.
57. Id. at 165. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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59. See generally Berman, supra note 4, at 670.
60. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
61. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
62. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27; Jones, 526 U.S.
at 232-39.
63. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 232-39.
64. Id. at 251 n.11.
65. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468-69 (citing N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1999)).
66. Id. at 490.
67. See Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of
Federalism as a Structural Limit on Errors, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1 (2003) (detailing the limited effect Apprendi had on a variety of
areas in the criminal sentencing process).
68. 542 U.S. 296, 298 (2004).
69. Id. at 304.
70. Id. at 304 n.9.
71. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES
V.
BOOKER
ON
FEDERAL
SENTENCING
12
(2006),
http://www.ussc.gov/booker_report/Booker_Report.pdf.
72. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
73. 542 U.S. 956 (2004).
74. See Berman, supra note 4, 675-76.
75. Booker, 543 U.S. at 237.
76. Booker, 543 U.S. at 222.
77. Id. at 264.
78. See United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 525 (2d Cir.
2005) (“District courts remain statutorily obliged to calculate
guidelines ranges in the same manner as before Booker and to find
facts relevant to sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence”);
United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting
that ordinarily, the sentencing judge must determine the applicable
guidelines range in the same manner as before Booker; this process
includes finding all facts relevant to sentencing using a
preponderance of the evidence standard); United States v. Stone, 432
F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2005) (“District courts . . . must,
therefore, calculate the guideline range as they would have done
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prior to Booker . . . .”); United States v. Rodriguez-Alvarez, 425
F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Sentencing courts must continue to
calculate the applicable guidelines range even though the guidelines
are now advisory.”).
79. United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2005)
(citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 263-64).
80. Id. (internal citations omitted).
81. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246.
82. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 71, at 21 n.150
(citing the Guidelines Manual, §1B1.3 (2005), to enumerate the
variety of determinations that are still within the province of a
sentencing court).
Specifically, Commission observes that the
Guidelines provide that defendant’s offense level shall be
determined on the basis of the following:
(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
caused by the defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly
undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme,
endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in
concert with others, whether or not charged as a
conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and
omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation
for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
detection or responsibility for that offense; (2) solely
with respect to offenses of a character for which USSG
§3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all
acts and omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) and
(1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction;
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions
specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all
harm that was the object of such acts and omissions; and
(4) any other information specified in the applicable
guideline.
Id.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 17
(1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.
2005); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006);
United States v. Sander, 178 F. App’x 221 (4th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.
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Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 898 (6th Cir. 2006); McReynolds v. United
States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pirani,
406 F.3d 543, 551 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States v.
Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kelly, 159
F. App’x 864, 867-68 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thomas, 446
F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d
764, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
84. Coffee, 434 F.3d at 898.
85. United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir.
2006).
86. See Note 23, supra, and accompanying text; see also As the
Sixth Circuit Booker Word Turns, Appellate Law and Practice Blog, at
http://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/2005/02/as_the_sixth_ci.html#
more/ (Feb. 17, 2005).
87. 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir 2005).
88. Id. at 378 (“Given this extension of the length of Oliver’s
sentence beyond that supported by the facts determined by the jury,
we must conclude that the district court’s sentencing determination
violated the Sixth Amendment.”).
89. Id. at 380 (quoting United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865,
877 (6th Cir. 2004)). For other early Sixth Circuit interpretations
of Booker, see United States v. Smith, 404 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (6th
Cir. 2005), and see United States v. Merkosky, 135 F. App’x 828,
836-37 (6th Cir. 2005).
90. See United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir.
2005).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Adkins, 429 F.3d 631, 633 (6th
Cir. 2005) (holding that when defendant explicitly declines to
object to PSR, conduct is deemed admitted for sentencing purposes);
United States v. Roper, 266 F.3d 526, 531-32 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding defendant’s withdrawal of objection and stipulation to
drug quantity in PSR provided requisite factual basis for enhanced
sentence); United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638, 648 (6th Cir.
1998) (holding defendant’s statement that he had no objections to
the PSR constitutes an express admission of the amount and type of
drugs attributed to the defendant in the report); United States v.
Loggins, 136 F. App’x 789, 793 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Because the
district court did not base the Defendant’s sentence on any fact
other than that which the Defendant admitted here (by not objecting
to the presentence report), the Defendant’s sentence did not
violate the Sixth Amendment.”); United States v. Clements, 142 F.
App’x 223, 229 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Stafford,
258 F.3d 465, 476 (6th Cir. 2001)) (holding that defendant’s
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withdrawal of his objection to drug quantities in PSR operated as
an admission); United States v. Harris, 132 F. App’x 46, 48-49 (6th
Cir. 2005) (holding defendant was deemed to have admitted that his
crime involved three firearms where he failed to object to
inclusion of this fact in PSR).
92. United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 2005).
Note, however, the language of the concurring opinion, rhetoric
that ultimately became the prevailing law governing the propriety of
judicial fact-finding. Note 20, supra, and accompanying text.
93. 409 F.3d 304 (6th Cir. 2005).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 309.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 310.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 312-13.
100. Coffee, 434 F.3d at 898; c.f. United States v. Williams,
411 F.3d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2005).
101. United States v. Katzopoulos, 437 F.3d 569, 574-75 (6th
Cir. 2006) (holding that the admission of reliable hearsay at
sentencing did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights).
102. See United States v. Vaught, 133 F. App’x 229, 233 (6th
Cir. 2005) (“The United States need not charge and convict the
defendant with the ‘other’ offense; it need only prove the facts
supporting the greater charge by a preponderance of the evidence.”);
United States v. Hopson, No. 05-3253, 2006 WL 1913414, at *1 n.3
(6th Cir. June 11, 2006) (unpublished).
103. Oliver, 397 F.3d at 378; c.f. United States v. Barnett,
398 F.3d 516, 526-31 (6th Cir. 2005); Loggins, 136 F. App’x at 793
(6th Cir. 2005).
104. United States v. Christopher, 415 F.3d 590, 592 (6th Cir.
2005).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 593-94 (citing United States v. Strbac, 129 F.
App’x 235, 237-38 (6th Cir. 2005)). Accord, e.g., United States v.
Hill, 411 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino, 401
F.3d 471, 482 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thompson, 403 F.3d
533, 535 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Serrano-Dominguez, 406
F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Anderson, 124 F.
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App’x 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2005).
107. See generally United States v. Wilson, 438 F.3d 672, 675
(6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cheney, No. 04-6516, 2006 WL
1478515, at *1 (6th Cir. May 24, 2006) (unpublished); United States
v. Johnson, No. 04-2474, 2006 WL 1549945, at **3-4 (6th Cir. June 7,
2006) (unpublished).
108. United States v. Vonner, 452 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir.
2006).
109. United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005)) (third
alteration in original), cert. denied, – U.S. -, 126 S. Ct. 1110
(2006).
110. See United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 n.3 (6th
Cir. 2006).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
112. Vonner, 452 F.3d at 565 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
114. United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 305 (6th Cir. 2005).
115. Webb, 403 F.3d at 383; see Jackson, 408 F.3d at 305
(noting that a mere listing of factors by a sentencing court is
insufficient; “an appellate court must still have the articulation
of the reasons the district court reached the sentence ultimately
imposed, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)”). Interestingly, the
district court in Jackson departed downward from the recommended
Guidelines range.
In vacating defendant’s sentence, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the district court did not sufficiently
articulate reasons to justify a downward departure from the
Guidelines.
116. United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816 (6th Cir.
2005) (quoting United States v. Washington, 147 F.3d 490, 491 (6th
Cir. 1998)); accord, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 626
(6th Cir. 2005) (“The court need not recite these factors but must
articulate its reasoning in deciding to impose a sentence in order
to allow for reasonable appellate review.”).
117. See United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir.
2006).
118. Jackson, 408 F.3d at 305.
119. See Note 18, supra, and accompanying text.
After the
Sixth Circuit’s Williams decision, four circuits declined to adopt a
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presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Jiménez-Beltre,
440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States v.
Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Cooper,
437 F.3d 324, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Zavala, 443
F.3d 1165, 1168-70 (9th Cir. 2006).
120. 436 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2006).
121. Id. at 708, 708 n.1 (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 134
F. App’x 595, 598 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Although the Sentencing
Guidelines are not mandatory, sentences within the prescribed range
are presumptively reasonable.”)); see United States v. Mares, 402
F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“If the sentencing judge exercises
her discretion to impose a sentence within a properly calculated
Guideline range, in our reasonableness review we will infer that the
judge has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth
in the Guidelines.”); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608
(7th Cir. 2005) (“The best way to express the new balance, in our
view, is to acknowledge that any sentence that is properly
calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness.”); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d
716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005) (utilizing presumption of reasonableness).
122. Williams, 436 F.3d at 708-09.
123. United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir.
2006).
124. Id.
125. United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2006).
126. Id. at 553-54; see United States v. Morris, 448 F.3d 929,
931 (6th Cir. 2006) (“This rebuttable presumption does not relieve
the district court of the obligation to consider other relevant
statutory factors or sufficiently articulate its reasoning so as to
permit reasonable appellate review.”).
127. Vonner, 452 F.3d at 567-69.
128. Id. at 568.
129. Id. (citing McBride, 434 F.3d at 476 n.3).
130. Id. at 565.
131. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 71, at 35 (citing
United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006)).
132. Id.
133. For one such commentary, note United States v. Buchanan,
449 F.3d 731, 735-41 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring).
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134. See id. (“If I have one anxiety about the presumption, it
is the risk that it will cast a discouraging shadow on trial judges
who otherwise would grant variances in exercising their independent
judgment.”).
135. State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149, 150 (Me. 1991).
136. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(1); see State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d
1151, 1154 (Me. 1993) (noting trial court must consider, at step
one, “‘the particular nature and seriousness of the offense without
regard to the circumstances of the offender’” (quoting State v.
Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991))).
137. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(2).
138. State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13, 893 A.2d 611, 616 (citing
Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1154).
139. State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991).
140. Id.
141. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(3).
142. State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Me. 1993).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
144. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151.
145. Murder is a class of crime unto itself, carrying a minimum
sentence of twenty-five years and a maximum sentence of life in
prison. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251.
146. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252. Under the current law, a defendant
who commits a “Class A” may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
“not to exceed 30 years.” Id. § 1252(2)(A). Correspondingly, “[i]n
the case of a Class B crime, the court shall set a definite period
not to exceed 10 years[.]” Id. § 1252(2)(B). A “Class C” crime is
punishable by a definite period of imprisonment “not to exceed 5
years.” Id. § 1252(2)(C). A “Class D” crime is punishable by a
period of “less than one year” while a “Class E” crime is punishable
by a period of imprisonment “not to exceed 6 months.”
Id. §
1252(2)(D)-(E).
As discussed more fully below, this Paper focuses on section
1252(2)(A) as written before the legislature’s most recent 2004
amendment.
147. Lewis, 590 A.2d at 151.
148. Id. (quoting Com. Amend. A to L.D. 2312, No. H-720 (113th
Legis. 1988)).
149.

P.L.

1987,

ch.

808,
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codified

at

17-A

M.R.S.A.

§§

1252(2)(A), 1252-B (Supp. 1990).
150. 590 A.2d 149, 150 (Me. 1991).
151. Lewis, 590 A.2d at 151. Following the issuance of Lewis,
the Legislature amended section 1252(2)(A) to incorporate the twotier approach. P.L. 1995, ch. 473, § 1 (effective Sept. 29, 1995).
152. Id.
153. Id.; State v. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 16, 876 A.2d 43, 48
(noting utility of the preponderance of the evidence standard in
sentencing).
154. State v. Roberts, 641 A.2d 177, 179 n.3 (Me. 1994)
(“Inherent in determining the basic period of incarceration for a
Class A offense is establishing whether the statutory maximum
sentence that can be imposed for that offense is twenty years or the
extended range of forty years, and fixing the basic period of
incarceration within that limit.”) (citing State v. Shackelford, 634
A.2d 1292, 1295 (Me. 1993)); see State v. Cobb, 2006 ME 43, ¶ 11
n.7, 895 A.2d 972, 976 (observing that the trial court should “have
determined whether it would be considering a sentence in the upper
tier before beginning the three-part Hewey analysis”).
155. State v. Hawkins, 633 A.2d 78, 79 (Me. 1993) (emphasis
added).
156. State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154 (Me. 1993).
157. E.g., State v. Carr, 1998 ME 237, ¶ 5, 719 A.2d 531, 533
(“For Class A crimes, the trial court must also decide whether the
basic period of incarceration is within two discrete zones-the
extended forty-year range, pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A),
or the usual twenty-year range.”) (citing Lewis, 590 A.2d at 151)
(emphasis added).
158. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1990); see
State v. Corbett, 618 A.2d 222, 223 (Me. 1992) (“In evaluating the
nature and seriousness of the offense we place the criminal conduct
on a continuum for each type of offense ‘to determine which act
justifies the imposition of the most extreme punishment.’” (quoting
State v. St. Pierre, 584 A.2d 618, 621 (Me. 1990))); State v.
Lilley, 624 A.2d 935, 937 (Me. 1993) (“A comparison of this case
with other recent cases supports our conclusion that defendant’s
sentence resulted from an error in principle and that the suspended
portion of defendant’s final sentence is disproportionate to
sentences for comparable offenders.”). Given the high standard of
appellate review for sentences, the importance of the sentencing
court’s determination cannot be overstated. See State v. Weir, 600
A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991) (“[W]e accord the sentencing court great
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deference in weighing these [aggravating and mitigating] factors in
order that it may appropriately individualize each sentence.”);
accord State v. Tapley, 609 A.2d 722, 723 (Me. 1992).
159. Id.; compare State v. Kehling, 601 A.2d 620, 624 (Me.
1991) (“The nature of the crime committed by defendant Kehling in
setting an apartment house afire in the early morning hours was
sufficiently heinous and violent to justify the imposition of a
basic sentence at the top of the upper range recognized by Lewis.”),
with State v. Corbett, 618 A.2d 222, 224 (Me. 1992) (reversing
defendant’s elevated sentence because although she sold one and
one-half grams of cocaine nearby school grounds, “the sales occurred
after school hours and minors were not involved”).
160. State v. Gallant, 600 A.2d 830 (Me. 1991) (“In making its
sentencing decision, the court is not limited to facts found at
trial.”) (citing State v. Dumont, 507 A.2d 164, 166 (Me. 1986)).
Indeed, as the Gallant court indicated, “[t]he facts contained in a
presentence report may properly influence the court’s sentence if
the defendant has the opportunity to challenge the report.” Id.
161. State v. Clark, 591 A.2d 462, 464-65 (Me. 1991) (“The
upper quadrant of the sentencing range is reserved for offenses that
are accomplished, for example, with extreme violence and accompanied
by serious physical injury.”).
162. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 18, 745 A.2d 368, 374. In
rejecting the theory that only violent crimes could qualify for an
upper-tier sentence, the court stated as follows:
We next address the defendants’ contention that the court
engaged in a misapplication of principle when it found
that the sentences met the criteria for the upper tier.
Primarily, Sweet and Poulin argue that their conduct
leading to the gross sexual assault charges was not
violent,
and
therefore
enhanced
sentences
were
inappropriate. They are correct that their conduct did
not
include
forced,
precipitously
violent,
or
injury-producing conduct.
Rather, their method of
obtaining victims had as its center point coercion, not
physical violence. Stripped to its essence, their goal
was to create willing and eager sexual partners of
children. By their actions, they exposed their victims
to an environment of sex, alcohol, and pornography. They
undertook these actions with boys whose ages placed them
at the cusp of sexual development. Their actions in this
regard may well have created greater long-term damage to
their victims than a violent one-time assault could have
done. In addition, the young victims were subjected to
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anal penetration, attempted penetration, and a variety of
other physically intrusive sexual activities.
We
conclude, as did the sentencing court, that such conduct
is sufficiently heinous that the absence of precipitous
violence does not preclude a sentence in the upper tier.
Id. (footnote omitted).
163. State v. Cobb, 2006 ME 43, ¶ 22, 895 A.2d 972, 978 (“[T]he
elevation into the upper tier does not require submission to a jury
if it is based solely on prior convictions.”). This Paper notes the
inclusion of this category solely for the sake of completeness.
Given that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), excepts “the fact of a prior conviction” from
the general rule that sentencing-enhancing facts must be found by a
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the discussion below will
not revisit the impact of prior convictions on a defendant’s
sentence. E.g., United States v. Poole, 407 F.3d 767, 777 (6th Cir.
2005) (“Booker’s holding, that the Sixth Amendment bars mandatory
enhancements based on judicial fact-finding, does not apply to the
‘fact of a prior conviction.’”).
164. State v. Cooper, 617 A.2d 1011, 1016 (Me. 1992) (noting
trial court, in enhancing defendant’s sentence, emphasized “the
savage and brutal nature of the attack and the fact that Cooper left
the victim to die in the woods where his open wounds became infested
with maggots”).
165. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 18, 745 A.2d at 374.
166. See Note 163, supra, and accompanying text (noting Paper
will not discuss impact of a defendant’s criminal history on his or
her sentence).
167. Clark, 591 A.2d at 464.
168. State v. Cloutier, 646 A.2d 358, 361 (Me. 1994) (“None of
the arsons committed in this case, even taking into account that
those committed on June 14 were successive fires that affected the
ability of the fire departments to combat each separate fire,
greatly increasing the risk of death and destruction for each fire
set, were committed against a person so as to justify basic periods
of incarceration in excess of twenty years.”), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Berube, 1997 ME 165, ¶ 19, 698 A.2d 509, 515.
169. E.g., State v. Babbitt, 658 A.2d 651, 654 (Me. 1995) (“The
drug sales involved in this case, although serious offenses, cannot
be classified as crimes of violence.”); State v. Hawkins, 633 A.2d
78, 80 (Me. 1993) (“The drug sales involved here, although serious,
cannot be classified as crimes of violence by any rational
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interpretation of legislative intent.”).
170. 2005 ME 82, 876 A.2d 43.
171. The articles covering the complex factual and procedural
history of this case are far too many to mention.
For a
representative sample, see Virginia Heffernan, Good Intentions in
Maine Leave a Girl Dead and a Mother in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2003, at E1; Meadow Rue Merrill, Foster Child’s Death Raises
Questions in Maine, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2001, at B1; Associated
Press, Foster Child’s Death in Maine Prompts Scrutiny of System by
State Lawmakers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 29, 2001, at A16. The
public’s fascination with the Schofield case culminated with a PBS
special dedicated to examining the life of the victim, Logan Marr,
and the bureaucracy that led to her death. Frontline: Failure to
Protect (PBS television broadcast Jan. 30, 2003). Schofield’s name
remains in the public eye given her decision to again challenge her
sentence. E.g., Gregory D. Kesich, Justices to Gauge Child-killer’s
Sentence,
PORTLAND
PRESS
HERALD,
June
3,
2006,
http://pressherald.mainetoday.com/news/state/060603schofield.shtml;
Gary Remal, Court to Review Schofield Case Again, KENNEBEC JOURNAL
ONLINE,
May
25,
2006,
http://kennebecjournal.mainetoday.com/news/local/2768281.shtml.
172. State v. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 3, 876 A.2d 43, 45. The
unique facts of State v. Schofield prompted award-winning journalist
Terrilyn Simpson to exhaustively document the events leading up to,
and including, Schofield’s trial. Using an independent newspaper to
tell Schofield’s story, Simpson dedicated twenty-eight pages to
chronicling the tragic events preceding Logan Marr’s death.
Terrilyn Simpson, Logan’s Truth: Five-year-old Logan Marr Died While
in the Custody of the Maine Department of Human Services, Calling
into Question DHS Methods and Tactics, COMMON SENSE INDEPENDENT (October
2002), available at http://www.asmainegoes.com/loganstruth.htm#Down
(hereinafter “Logan’s Truth”).
Given the majority opinion’s
decision to include few facts giving rise to the Schofield case,
this Paper periodically references Simpson’s work and the PBS
Frontline special for background details.
173. Frontline: Failure to Protect – The Taking of Logan Marr,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/marr/ (last
visited July 14, 2006).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
2001. Id.

Schofield ultimately quit her job at DHS in January

184. Id.
185. PBS articulately described this period of Schofield’s
relationship with Logan as follows:
As Logan’s behavior deteriorated, Sally found herself at
a loss.
Logan would rage out of control, screaming,
kicking, and thrashing so violently that Sally was afraid
she would hurt herself.
Suddenly, all the confidence
Sally had accumulated as a parent and a DHS caseworker
seemed to vanish. “I was supposed to be trained,” she
told FRONTLINE. “I was supposed to be educated. How come
I couldn’t help her? How come I didn’t know what to do?”
Frontline: Failure to Protect – The Taking of Logan Marr,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/marr/ (last
visited July 14, 2006).
186. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 3, 876 A.2d 43, 45.
187. Logan’s Truth at 20.
188. Id. at 22.
189. Id.
190. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 4, 876 A.2d at 46 (quoting
sentencing court).
191. Logan’s Truth at 22.
Terrilyn Simpson described the
events that followed the authorities’ arrival at Schofield’s home as
follows:
Wearing a pink jersey and a light-colored pair of
overalls, Logan’s face was pale. Barefooted, one of her
toes was bleeding, suggesting she’d struck it against the
concrete wall she’d been left facing from the high chair
although [investigator] Mills had no way of knowing that.
When

a

firefighter

arrived
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as

part

of

the

rescue

response, Mills carried Logan upstairs. She’d wet
herself. Mills said the child vomited over his shoulder;
the coroner later explained the incident as “postmortem
regurgitation” and explained that “when people die,” they
also frequently lose bowel and bladder control.
Id. at 23.
192. Id. Schofield’s teenage son testified at trial that his
mother actually made two trips up the basement stairs; the first,
prosecutors believed, was to get a tool to cut the duct tape and the
second, as discussed above, was to call 9-1-1.
Id. at 22-23.
Prosecutors further theorized that Schofield was not simply trying
to save Logan, but instead was “desperate” to remove the duct tape
before calling 9-1-1. Id. at 23.
193. Frontline: Failure to Protect – The Taking of Logan Marr,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/marr/ (last
visited July 14, 2006).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Logan’s Truth at 22.
197. Frontline: Failure to Protect – The Taking of Logan Marr,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/marr/ (last
visited July 14, 2006).
198. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 5, 876 A.2d at 46.
199. Id.
200. Id.
transcript).

at

¶

7,

876

A.2d

at

46-47 (quoting sentencing

201. Maine does not have a parole system. Instead, sentences
of imprisonment can be ordered to be fully served in incarceration,
can be wholly suspended with probation, or can be split, with an
unsuspended portion of the sentence to be served in incarceration,
followed by a period of probation. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2).
202. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 8, 876 A.2d at 47.
203. Id. ¶ 10, 876 A.2d at 47.
204. Id. ¶ 21, 876 A.2d at 49-50.
205. Id. ¶ 40, 876 A.2d at 54-55.
Notably, the court
subsequently altered a portion of this paragraph.
In this
paragraph, the court initially outlined a jury instruction, which
the trial judge was directed to read to the jury in the event that
Schofield, in fact, elected a jury to determine the facts necessary
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to impose an enhanced sentence. Id. In State v. Averill, 2005 ME
83, 887 A.2d 519, however, the court modified a portion of the jury
instruction. That modification is not relevant to this Paper.
206. Schofield, 2005 ME 85, ¶ 41, 876 A.2d at 55.
207. E.g., State v. Averill, 2005 ME 83, 887 A.2d 519. At the
outset, it bears noting that the same citation to Averill reveals
two separate opinions, the most recent of which merely revises a
portion of Schofield. See Note 205, supra, and accompanying text.
The substantive Averill opinion reflects that the sentencing court
determined that the manner in which defendant committed the sexual
assault for which he was found guilty comprised one of the most
heinous ways such an act could occur. Id. ¶ 4, 887 A.2d at 521. The
sentencing court therefore concluded that an upper-tier sentence was
appropriate. Id. After appealing his sentence, Averill contended
that “he was entitled to have the issue of heinousness presented to
the jury and was denied his Sixth Amendment rights when a sentence
in excess of twenty years was imposed without his being given the
opportunity to have a jury make that determination.” Id. ¶ 7, 887
A.2d at 521.
Citing Schofield, the SJC agreed with Averill’s
arguments and, accordingly, remanded for resentencing. Id. ¶ 9, 887
A.2d at 521-22. In doing so, the court noted that although Averill
could constitutionally be sentenced without further fact-finding to
a sentence of twenty-years or less, “[a] sentencing trial is
required if the State recommends, and/or the court is inclined to
impose, a sentence in excess of twenty years based on heinousness.”
Id. ¶ 10, 887 A.2d at 522; cf. State v. Miller, 2005 ME 84, 875
A.2d 694 (holding no constitutional problem arose from judicial
fact-finding in discretionary sentencing under distinct statutory
provision).
208. P.L. 2003, ch. 657, § 10 (effective July 30, 2004)
(codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A) (Supp. 2004)).
209. Id.
210. Schofield, 2005 ME 85, ¶ 9 n.4, 876 A.2d at 47 (quoting
L.D. 1844 Statement of Fact (121st Legis. 2004)).
211. E.g., Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing
Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 8 (1993) (outlining the general
arguments in favor of, and against, determinate and indeterminate
sentencing).
212. Accord Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice:
Experiences of African American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4
AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 1, 37 (1995).
213. E.g., Daniel Weiss, California’s Inequitable Parole
System: A Proposal to Reestablish Fairness, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1573,
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1605 n.79 (2005).
214. E.g., United States v. Brown, 453 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th
Cir. 2006) (vacating below-guideline sentence); United States v.
Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1242 (11th Cir. 2006) (same). The recent
numbers published by the sentencing commission are nothing short of
staggering. Indeed, only in 5.2% of cases are defendants receiving
a downward departure from their applicable advisory guidelines
range. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT: CASES
SENTENCED
SUBSEQUENT
TO
U.S.
V.
BOOKER
16
(2006),
http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_060106.pdf.
215. As noted, the Sixth Circuit instructs that “when a
defendant challenges a district court’s sentencing determination,
[the Court is] instructed to determine ‘whether [the] sentence is
unreasonable.’” Webb, 403 F.3d at 383.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 433 F.3d 31, 35 (1st
Cir. 2005) (observing that despite Booker’s reasonableness standard,
the court continues to review the district court’s interpretations
of the legal meaning of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its
factual findings for clear error); United States v. Villegas, 404
F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that de novo standard still
applies to determining whether the district court correctly
interpreted and applied the sentencing guidelines); United States v.
Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e continue to review
the district court’s factual findings at sentencing for clear error
and the application of those facts to the Sentencing Guidelines de
novo.”).
217. Confusingly, at least one court views the reasonableness
inquiry to involve asking whether the district court abused its
discretion in announcing sentence. See United States v. Pizano, 403
F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2005) (“To make the reasonableness
determination, we ask whether the district court abused its
discretion.”).
218. United States v. Montanez, 442 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir.
2006) (“We review legal conclusions regarding the application of
Guideline provisions de novo.” (citing United States v. Foreman,
436 F.3d 638, 640 (6th Cir. 2006)).
219. United States v. Davidson, 409 F.3d 304, 310 (6th Cir.
2005).
As discussed above, the Davidson opinion appears
particularly problematic in light of Booker. Simply stated, the
Davidson decision tacitly approves of the imposition of post-Booker
sentencing enhancements based neither on facts proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, nor admitted to by the defendant. The
utilization of the Davidson court’s “non-mandatory Guideline
recommendation” plainly departs from Supreme Court precedent.
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Indeed, regardless of the name assigned to describe the Davidson
decision’s analysis, the result creates a tenuous Booker loophole
allowing the backdoor utilization of unconstitutional judicial factfinding to support sentencing enhancements.
220. United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir.
1990) (“We review the district court's determination of a
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility under a clearly erroneous
standard.” (citing United States v. Wilson, 878 F.2d 921, 923 (6th
Cir. 1989))). “Whether a defendant has accepted responsibility for
criminal conduct is a question of fact, and the district court’s
determination on this issue will be disturbed only if clearly
erroneous.” United States v. Lunsford, No. 95-1507, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6552, *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1996) (unpublished) (citations
omitted).
221. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 15, 745 A.2d 368, 372-73
(noting “sentencing court is in a better position to review
aggravating and mitigating factors”).
222. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13, 745 A.2d at 372 (acknowledging that
sentencing process is complex and sentencing court is tasked with
attempting to accomplish several goals).
223. 15 M.R.S.A. § 2152 (2005).
224. See generally Daniel E. Wathen, Judges on Judging: Making
Law the Old Fashioned Way -- One Case at a Time, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
612, 619-20 (1991) (discussing the limited number of sentencing
appeals granted in Maine).
225. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1990) (“It is
not enough that the members of this court might have passed a
different sentence, rather it is only when a sentence appears to err
in principle that we will alter it.”).
226. State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Me. 1993).
227. Id.
228. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 22, 745 A.2d 368, 373.
Moreover, any appellate review must be guided by (1) the opportunity
to provide for the correction of sentences, (2) the need to promote
respect for the law, (3) the need to “facilitate the possible
rehabilitation of an offender[,]” and (4) the chance to promote the
sentencing court’s adherence to applicable sentencing criteria. 15
M.R.S.A. § 2154 (2005).
229. One example is the so-called Sensenbrenner bill.
Defending America’s Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment
and Child Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 4547, 108th Cong. (2004).
Although the bill is purportedly a measure to promote drug treatment
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while protecting children, it actually includes sweepingly harsh
mandatory minimum sentences for a wide range of drug crimes. For
example, the bill as written would, inter alia, impose the following
penalties: (1) a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence upon a person
older than twenty-one who sells any quantity of any controlled
substance to a person younger than eighteen; (2) a life sentence
upon individuals twenty-one years or older who are convicted a
second time of distributing drugs to a person under eighteen; and
(3) an increase of the federal mandatory minimum sentence for the
sale of any type of controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a
school, college, public library, drug treatment facility, or
private/public daycare facilities, to five years.
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